Standing Committee G

[Mr. Edward O'Hara in the Chair]

Fire and Rescue Services Bill

Resolved, 
 That the Committee agrees with the Resolution of the Programming Sub-Committee—
 To delete the Table and insert:— 
 ProceedingsTime for conclusion of proceedings Clauses 1 to 24 6 pm at the 6th sitting Clauses 25 to 365 pm at the 8th sitting Clauses 37 to 51, Schedule 1, Clause 52, Schedule 2, Clauses 53 to 61, New Clauses, New Schedules, remaining proceedings on the Bill.5 pm at the 10th sitting [Mr. Raynsford] Clause 13Reinforcement schemes

Clause 13 - Reinforcement schemes

Question proposed, [12 February], That the clause stand part of the Bill.

Philip Hammond: As I recall, I had just sat down and was expecting to hear the Under-Secretary's words of wisdom in response. I have had to wait on tenterhooks for 12 days; I hope that the hon. Gentleman's words will be even wiser with the benefit of maturing over that time.

Phil Hope: The words have matured and even fermented over the last week or so.
 The clause largely re-enacts the existing provisions of the Fire Services Act 1947 which require fire and rescue authorities to enter into reinforcement schemes with other authorities, and it extends those provisions to the new core duties under the Bill. That will allow the authorities to provide mutual assistance in discharging the new duties and to notify the Secretary of State when they have done so. It also allows authorities to apportion between them the costs incurred in participating in a reinforcement scheme. 
 Reinforcement schemes are already in place between adjacent fire and rescue authorities and are integral to the day-to-day operational effectiveness of the fire and rescue service. As such schemes are essentially administrative in nature, authorities will not have to revise all their existing schemes as a result of the Bill. Instead, those schemes will simply continue to have effect under the new provisions in the clause. 
 Including the new core duties in such schemes will make it much easier for fire and rescue authorities to participate in wider reinforcement schemes, including on a regional and national scale in the event of a major incident, as well as providing simple cross-boundary assistance between authorities in the event of a fire. That wider approach to reinforcement will ensure cover for an authority responding to an emergency outside its area. 
 The fire and rescue service is trying to set up a national reinforcement scheme for emergencies. However, the existing legislation does not provide a solid statutory base for such a scheme, creating concern among fire and rescue authorities that participation in such a scheme will conflict with their local duties. The clause will allay those concerns by providing them with the statutory base that they need. I commend the clause to the Committee. 
 Question put and agreed to. 
 Clause 13 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 14 - Directions as to reinforcement schemes

Philip Hammond: I beg to move amendment No. 35, in
clause 14, page 7, line 34, after 'may', insert 'by order'.

Edward O'Hara: With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
 Amendment No. 36, in 
clause 14, page 7, line 35, leave out 'direction' and insert 'order'. 
Amendment No. 40, in 
clause 17, page 8, line 24, after 'may', insert 'by order'. 
Amendment No. 41, in 
clause 17, page 8, line 26, leave out 'direction' and insert 'order'. 
Amendment No. 42, in 
clause 17, page 8, line 29, leave out 'give a direction' and insert 'make an order'. 
Amendment No. 45, in 
clause 17, page 8, line 35, leave out 'give a direction' and insert 'make an order'.

Philip Hammond: It is good to be back after a short break, which has given me the opportunity to think up some more amendments for the remainder of the Bill's time in Committee.
 Clause 14 runs directly on, as one would expect, from clause 13. It gives the Secretary of State the power to give directions on the reinforcement schemes about which the Under-Secretary has been speaking. Some of the amendments deal with other clauses, but they have broadly the same effect. 
 The clause deals with the Secretary of State's power to intervene to make an order on reinforcement in a situation where, by implication, authorities cannot agree to work together. That does not strike us as a terribly auspicious basis on which to build co-operation and collaboration. I am always wary of either voluntary arrangements that are made with the albatross of the Secretary of State's intervention hanging over them or compulsory arrangements to promote co-operation. Co-operation must come from 
 the bottom up and cannot be imposed from the top down. However, we accept that the Secretary of State may need a reserve power to require an authority to enter into a reinforcement scheme, to guard against authorities playing an awkward game, which hopefully is unlikely. I hope that the Under-Secretary can assure us that he would not expect such a power to be used routinely and that the Government acknowledge that genuine co-operation and collaboration cannot be imposed by order from Whitehall. 
 The circumstances in which such an order might be made will invariably involve the Secretary of State taking the side of one authority against another. Although I may be wrong, it seems unlikely that the Secretary of State will order a reinforcement scheme between two authorities that are both reluctant to enter into it. A much more likely scenario is that one authority refuses to co-operate with a scheme that another authority is seeking to introduce, which perhaps involves all the authorities on its borders. Where the Secretary of State intervenes to take the part of one supposedly independent body against another, there needs to be an adjudication process to review and scrutinise what he is proposing. 
 Initially, I wondered whether there should be a compulsory inquiry along the lines of the permissive power in subsection (3). On reflection, however, I decided that that would not be the most appropriate way to deal with the circumstances that we are considering. With the amendment, and with others relating to clauses 15 and 17, we have therefore sought to provide for the Secretary of State to make the direction by an order that could theoretically be subject to parliamentary scrutiny in a short debate in a Standing Committee. That seems to be a light touch and is a perfectly reasonable and sensible way to proceed. If the order were uncontroversial, it would not necessarily be debated, but if there were an element of controversy and the authority that was being coerced, if I can use that term, wished to raise objections—[Interruption.] I am glad to see that the attention of the Minister of State—the Minister with responsibility for UK resilience—has been drawn to the knocking sound above the ceiling. No doubt he is alert to the risks that might be lurking there and will draw the Committee's attention to them if necessary. 
 If what the Government were proposing were sufficiently controversial for one of the fire authorities involved to enlist the support of Members of Parliament to scrutinise Ministers, the mechanism suggested in the amendment would be a sensible and light-touch way of allowing them to do so. We would have plenty of time to do what was needed without going over old ground, and we could hold a Standing Committee on a statutory instrument at 8.55 am before a Standing Committee on a Bill took place. Making directions the subject of an order would allow there to be scrutiny, albeit not much, of the exercise of the significant power to override the right of a locally 
 accountable authority to reject arrangements, or to enter into arrangements that it finds appropriate for its circumstances. 
 As I said earlier, amendments Nos. 40, 41, 42 and 43 deal with the same matters in clause 17, and would make the directions that the Secretary of State can give subject to statutory instrument and therefore debatable in Parliament. I hope that the Under-Secretary agrees that that would provide the degree of scrutiny that these matters need: something rather less than a full inquiry, but more than simply an instruction issued from Whitehall without any necessity for external scrutiny.

John Pugh: I am sympathetic to what the hon. Member for Runnymede and Weybridge (Mr. Hammond) has said—any attempt to prevent local authorities being bullied by the Secretary of State is to be commended—but I am a little unclear as to what his amendments would achieve. As I understand it, one effect would be almost to incorporate Standing Committees into the Executive as courts of appeal, rather than having them look at the general principles of legislation or a particular order made by the Government. It slightly worries me that they could function on a regular basis as some kind of additional arm of the Executive, and it would help if the hon. Gentleman clarified that. It is not clear to me whether, if the proposals were incorporated in the Bill, we, as a statutory instrument Committee looking at orders made under this legislation, would be doing quite the same kind of work as we normally do.

Philip Hammond: As I understand it, if these directions were made by order, they would be laid in the normal way as a draft statutory instrument, they could be prayed against by any Member of this House and, if sufficient pressure were applied, a debate would no doubt be allowed. They would be dealt with in exactly the same way as all other secondary legislation coming before the House. I fail to see how that would in any way become part of the process of the Executive. Scrutinising the Executive is a core function of Parliament. I appreciate that that scrutiny has become so diluted it is perhaps difficult to spot it in action, but it is, after all, at least theoretically, our principal function. The amendments simply try to extend the power of Parliament to scrutinise what the Executive are doing.

John Pugh: I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman. He says that he wants to extend the power of Parliament, and that is to some extent how it came across. I accept, and I want to put on record, that his experience of these things is far greater than mine, but it seems to me that the effect of the amendment would be to carve out work different from that normally done by Standing Committees on statutory instruments. I understand the mechanics of the process, but the quality of what we would be doing seems to vary from what we normally do.

Philip Hammond: If the hon. Gentleman sits down by way of invitation to intervene—

John Pugh: I have finished.

Philip Hammond: In that case, I should like to comment further. I can understand the hon. Gentleman's concern, and the error must be mine. It must lie in how I expressed the intentions of the amendment. It is not our intention to introduce a new class of scrutiny; it is rather to try to resist the growing tendency to make what is effectively secondary legislation by directions issued by Ministers from their Departments without the need for parliamentary scrutiny. The Secretary of State would never have to make such a direction if all the authorities involved were in agreement, so there would be at least one aggrieved party as a result of such a direction being made. Such a matter is, by definition, contentious, and it is entirely appropriate that that direction should be made by statutory instrument and that Members of the House of Commons and, indeed, the House of Lords should be able to debate it if they felt it necessary. In practice, that will happen where the aggrieved authority regards the matter as sufficiently serious to lobby Opposition Members or perhaps Government Members. It is not inconceivable that a Labour Back Bencher would pray against a statutory instrument if local issues were involved—anything is possible these days, as we have seen over the past couple of months.
 The intention behind the amendments is to make such scrutiny possible, and I hope that the hon. Member for Southport (Dr. Pugh) and his party, which usually supports the strengthening of the legislature's power to scrutinise what the Executive are doing, will support a move to reduce the Executive's power to issue unscrutinised directions and to strengthen the legislature's power to scrutinise all contentious secondary legislation.

Phil Hope: Amendments Nos. 35 and 36 would require the Secretary of State to make an order before directing one or more fire and rescue authorities to participate in a reinforcement scheme.
 The clause largely re-enacts provisions of the 1947 Act, which allow the Secretary of State to direct fire and rescue authorities to enter into, vary or revoke a reinforcement scheme. The Secretary of State may invoke that power only where authorities are unable to come to an agreement about forming such a scheme and, more importantly for the purposes of the amendment, only at the request of one of the authorities. 
 As such, the Secretary of State's role is simply that of an adjudicator in a dispute between authorities over a practical arrangement. As is the case under existing legislation, all the parties involved will have the opportunity to make representations to him, and he may even cause an inquiry to be held if he feels that that would be helpful. Given that the parties involved have the opportunity to make representations and that there is the possibility of an inquiry, I see no need to introduce a degree of parliamentary scrutiny. 
 Amendments Nos. 40, 41, 42 and 45 would impose the same parliamentary scrutiny on the exercise of the Secretary of State's powers under clause 17 to give directions about arrangements entered into by fire and 
 rescue authorities under clause 16. Clause 17 also re-enacts provisions of the 1947 Act, giving the Secretary of State the power to require two authorities to enter into an arrangement under clause 16 or to vary or revoke such an arrangement. The Secretary of State can exercise his power if invited to do so by one or other of the authorities or on his own initiative. 
 Under clause 17, the Secretary of State therefore keeps his existing dual role, as provided for in section 12 of the 1947 Act. That is in part so that he can act as an umpire when asked to decide on a disagreement between two fire and rescue authorities. It also ensures that he has the power to initiate action when he believes it necessary. Any direction under clause 17 must be given with a view to securing greater economy, efficiency and effectiveness and can be issued only after consultation with the authorities affected. Again, the Secretary of State has the option to hold an inquiry if that would be appropriate. 
 I therefore say to the hon. Member for Runnymede and Weybridge that I see no reason for the direction to be subject to an order-making power, which would, as the hon. Member for Southport said, give hon. Members the opportunity to micro-manage the running of fire and rescue authorities. It would also add delay and cause uncertainty about the delivery of a public service should the order be revoked. 
 Given those problems, I ask the hon. Member for Runnymede and Weybridge to withdraw the amendment, which is simply unnecessary.

Philip Hammond: I am disappointed to hear the Under-Secretary justify the provisions simply by saying that they replicate the 1947 Act. It would be a grim business if we spent out our time in Committee repealing provisions from the 1947 Act and then reinstating them clause by clause, with no greater assurance of whether they were appropriate than the Minister's statement that they were in the Act whose provisions we had just repealed. That would be a time-wasting exercise. It is appropriate that we look at all the provisions of the 1947 Act that the Government intend to reinstate and consider whether, 57 years on, they are still appropriate and necessary and whether they further the cause—which I hold dear—of maintaining the independence, autonomy and local accountability of fire and rescue services.
 I am not persuaded by the Under-Secretary's apparent assumption that it is wrong for Parliament to consider the micro-management of fire authorities but right for the Secretary of State to intervene.

John Pugh: This raises a puzzle. For many of those 50 years the Conservatives were in power, but not until now do they find it necessary to scrutinise in the way that is being suggested, so they have made a belated conversion to this new role for Standing Committees on statutory instruments.

Philip Hammond: I am delighted to say that for none of those 50 years have the Liberals come anywhere near even a sniff of being in power. It will probably be the same for the next 50 years—actually, it was not the same for the whole of the previous 50 years.
 I make no apology for taking the opportunity, in Government time, to scrutinise a Bill, which, unusually, seeks to abolish the entirety of earlier legislation and then to reinstate rather a lot of it. I am sure that the Under-Secretary would not want to give the impression that he is abolishing chunks of the 1947 Act and then reinstating them without reviewing them. If the Government have reviewed them and decided that they continue to be required in more or less their original form, it is entirely appropriate that Parliament should assess whether it agrees with the Government's assessment. 
 I am not a great advocate of giving more quasi-judicial functions to the Secretary of State—be he such an eminent and dignified personage as the Deputy Prime Minister. It is not my view that politicians are primarily equipped to make quasi-judicial decisions. It does not seem to me obvious that where two democratically accountable bodies, both probably under party political control, disagree about how one of their functions should be discharged, a party politician holding the office of Secretary of State is the best-placed person to make that decision. 
 We do not necessarily have an alternative to the Secretary of State making a decision in extremis, but if a party politician holding that office is to make that quasi-judicial decision, it seems that people of other persuasions, with other views and perhaps with local connections to the authorities involved, might reasonably be afforded an opportunity to scrutinise the decision in a brief 90-minute Standing Committee, which would be the maximum allowed to deal with a statutory instrument.

Stephen McCabe: I want to make sure that I have understood the hon. Gentleman's position. Two elected authorities of politicians have difficulty coming to a single decision and are therefore referred to the Secretary of State, but the hon. Gentleman does not believe that politicians should make a decision, so he wants a Committee of more politicians to deliberate on that decision. Am I clear?

Nick Raynsford: Very good.

Philip Hammond: I am delighted to hear the Minister of State saying, ''Very good'', because, wearing another hat, he is engaged in a process of grafting on to us tiers of politicians to solve all sorts of problems. He seems to come from the school of thought that says the more politicians and elected bodies the better.
 I suggest to the hon. Member for Birmingham, Hall Green (Mr. McCabe) that if we take local democratic accountability seriously, we must regard local fire and rescue authorities as autonomous bodies. If the Secretary of State is to be given power to intrude on 
 that autonomy in a way that undermines the sense of local ownership and accountability, we need to ensure the maximum scrutiny of that activity. 
 I did not think that the amendments were tremendously radical; the proposals are simply designed to stop a pernicious tendency, which could almost be missed if one was not focused on the language of the Bill. In one clause, the Secretary of State makes an order; in the next, the Secretary of State makes a direction. A layman reading the Bill might think that those were the same thing, but of course they are different. An order is subject to parliamentary scrutiny and it is secondary legislation. A direction has exactly the same effect but is not subject to scrutiny, and it is simply slipped out in a letter from No. 26 Whitehall late on a Friday evening. I shall not press the amendment because it is a relatively minor point, but I am surprised that the Government have not been able to say anything reassuring.

Phil Hope: The hon. Gentleman asked whether this would be a routine matter. I would like to put it on the record that we do not anticipate this happening often, so it will not be routine. The measure provides for intervention where there is a dispute about participation in a reinforcement scheme. The Secretary of State will be able to make a sensible intervention following the request of one of the authorities taking part, or on his own initiative under clause 16, in order to make the system work efficiently and effectively. I repeat: this will not be routine, but a last resort. I hope that that helps the hon. Gentleman in deciding whether to press his amendment.

Philip Hammond: I am grateful to the Under-Secretary. With your permission, Mr. O'Hara, I hope to raise another question in a stand part debate, but perhaps it would be sensible if I extend what I was just saying so that we can move on.
 The Under-Secretary refers to the Secretary of State being able to act on his own initiative under clauses 16 and 17, but that is a separate issue that we will come to. Under clause 14, we are dealing with an application by one of the fire authorities involved. I wonder whether the hon. Gentleman can be a little more specific about how a Secretary of State will go about making that judgment. What weight will he give to what I consider to be the precious commodity of local autonomy when considering what is being proposed by the other fire authority? 
 Let us take the example of a large metropolitan fire authority such as Greater Manchester and the neighbouring, rather smaller, county brigade of Cheshire—I emphasis that the example is plucked from thin air and has no basis in reality. Let us suppose that the larger, metropolitan authority wanted to enter into a reinforcement scheme with its much smaller neighbour, but the terms of scheme and its operation led the smaller neighbour to fear that it would lose autonomy and be dominated by the needs of its larger neighbour to the detriment of its obligations and duties to its electors and citizens. When the Secretary of State came to make a decision in such a case what weight would he give to economy, efficiency and 
 effectiveness—cold and, to some extent, measurable concepts—as opposed to the important but much more difficult to measure commodities of local ownership and the sense of autonomy, control and accountability? 
 One of the things that concerns me hugely about the Bill and the national framework is that the Government are trying to impose a modernisation agenda based on an idea that, from the outset, has been counter-intuitive to a lot of people in the wider world: that a better service can be provided at less cost. Whether that can be achieved is for another debate, but Ministers have to acknowledge that a sceptical public are likely to regard that initially as counter-intuitive. As that programme is rolled out, any erosion of local control and accountability, whether by the Secretary of State or a large, powerful neighbouring fire authority, is likely to fuel scepticism. 
 If the Under-Secretary wants to help the Committee by elaborating on how the Secretary of State would make a decision between two autonomous independent bodies, perhaps he could also tell us about the existing power under the 1947 Act, which, as he has already told the Committee, the Secretary of State has possessed for the past 57 years. How many times has that power been used to impose a reinforcement scheme against the wishes of one of the fire authorities involved? Assuming that is only a small number, can the Minister tell the Committee about the circumstances that made it appropriate on those occasions to impose a reinforcement scheme? How was that decision reached between the opposing positions of the two or more fire authorities involved?

Phil Hope: Are we now debating clause stand part?

Edward O'Hara: No, we are still debating the amendment. I extended latitude to the hon. Member for Runnymede and Weybridge to save time.

Phil Hope: If I may, I shall deal with the hon. Gentleman's points directly.
 The hon. Gentleman mentioned his fears about modernisation, which have been articulated in the debates on earlier clauses. The Bain review looked at the nature of, and the need for, modernisation. The Bill is a radical transformation in the way that the fire service is structured and how it delivers its services. It is a shame that the hon. Gentleman is reluctant to embrace that agenda.

Philip Hammond: For the sake of clarity, I reiterate that we endorse Bain's modernisation proposals. The Government go much further in the Bill than we understood they would last summer, and they propose a framework for a wholesale reorganisation of the fire and rescue service on a coercive, regionalised basis.

Phil Hope: On the one hand, we hear that the hon. Gentleman supports modernisation, on the other he tells us that he does not want us to re-enact the 1947 provisions. We say, ''If it ain't broke, don't fix it.'' The parts of the Act that we propose to include are there to operate effectively. If they work, we wish to re-enact them, as we are doing now.
 The hon. Gentleman mentioned a particular example: a small authority fearing that a larger neighbour will do something in a reinforcement scheme that will be in some way detrimental to its duties. The Secretary of State will make judgments about such matters on a case-by-case basis, and he is unlikely to intervene in a dispute between two authorities in the way that has been described. 
 The measure has effect when there is a greater area of dispute; for example, if one inefficient authority is unprepared to co-operate with all the other authorities in trying to establish a national emergency scheme. Those are the type of circumstances in which we envisage the powers being invoked.

Philip Hammond: Is the Under-Secretary talking about firefighting, or the functions under clause 9?
 Phil Hope: Clause 13 deals with reinforcement schemes. They have been established for many years and are nothing unusual. 
 Clause 14 deals with the Secretary of State's ability to intervene, in response to a request by the local authority where there is a dispute and an arrangement cannot be agreed. The fire and rescue authorities were previously concerned that these matters were not set out on a statutory basis: they will be now. I made that point during the debate on clause 13. That reassures the authorities that they can enter into the kind of schemes that they believe to be in their own interest and that of public safety. 
 The hon. Gentleman's concern is unnecessary. Yes, the powers are there, but they are powers to intervene in the circumstances that I have described, such as those in which an unco-operative and inefficient individual authority prevents a wider group of authorities from entering into a mutual reinforcement scheme to the benefit of the people whom they serve.

Philip Hammond: Can the Under-Secretary tell the Committee anything about the circumstances in which that power of the Secretary of State has been exercised since 1947?

Phil Hope: Inspiration will come my way soon about whether such a power has been used in the past. Where authorities were in disagreement, we would not allow one inefficient authority to hold up the good work of the others. The power has not been used often in the past, but I shall write to the hon. Gentleman with the exact figure when we have tracked back through the records to 1947. A purely voluntary approach would not deliver the resilience necessary to ensure that we can meet the new terrorist threat to which many of the reinforcement schemes are intended to respond.
 I hope that I have reassured the Committee about the nature of the schemes that the clause would apply to and the circumstances in which the Secretary of State might intervene, which would be decided on a case-by-case basis. It would be, as I have described, when a regional or national reinforcement scheme was being developed and one local authority, through inefficiency or a lack of willingness to co-operate, could undermine arrangements that other fire rescue 
 authorities wanted to enter into. Those are the terms on which we have been endeavouring to proceed with the proposals, and I therefore ask the hon. Gentleman to withdraw the amendment.

Edward O'Hara: Order. Before we proceed, I want to make it clear that the way in which the debate has proceeded means that I am ruling that the clause stand part debate has been incorporated in the debate on the amendment. If any member of the Committee wishes to speak to clause stand part, he or she should do so now because I will put that question formally at the appropriate time.

Philip Hammond: Thank you for that clarification, Mr. O'Hara. I listened carefully to what the Under-Secretary said, and I am grateful to him for saying that he will write to me with details of the past use of the power. I wonder whether it has ever been used at all. It may not have been, which would put an interesting slant on the hon. Gentleman's saying, ''If it ain't broke, don't fix it''. If the power has not been used in over 55 years, do we really need it?

Stephen McCabe: Will the hon. Gentleman give way?

Philip Hammond: I should have guessed. I am happy to give way.

Stephen McCabe: If the provision has not been used in 57 years, perhaps the hon. Gentleman's worries are unjustified. The matter has never bothered any of his past or present colleagues. In fact, I should like to know the source of the inspiration for his sudden concern.

Philip Hammond: The source is obvious.

Stephen McCabe: Tell me.

Philip Hammond: I will, if the hon. Gentleman gives me a second. We are now being required to consider the Bill clause by clause, including those clauses that have been brought forward from the 1947 Act. I am a believer in small government; I do not suppose that the hon. Gentleman is. [Interruption.] I did not hear that, but I am sure that it was very amusing. Frankly, if legislation gives a Secretary of State significant powers to override the decisions of autonomous local authorities, and those powers have not been used in over 55 years, we might question whether we need them. That is a perfectly legitimate matter to raise.
 In his final words, which were generally emollient, the Under-Secretary said something that I find alarming. On the basis of the inspiration that reached him, he said that a purely voluntary approach to reinforcement would not deliver the resilience that is now required. That is an a priori condemnation of fire authorities and their willingness to work together. My contact with fire authorities suggests to me that most of them are jealous of their independence when it comes to dealing with their core local functions, but readily recognise that they need to submit to a broader pattern of command and control when dealing with resilience issues. 
 I am not aware of a fire authority having said that it intends to stand out against the resilience arrangements into which it would be entirely proper for fire and rescue authorities to enter when dealing with the discharge of their functions under clause 9. That was the point of my question to the Under-Secretary. 
 As we go through this debate, I find that, having prayed in aid draconian central powers, we have always a need for resilience against non-conventional threats. None of us would dispute that the unit of organisation for combating such threats needs to be much bigger because although such episodes will, hopefully, be rare, they call for specialist types of intervention. However, I am concerned that there is a theme throughout the Bill of praying in aid the resilience agenda in order to create a structure that is then applied to all core functions of fire authorities. 
 I would have taken a different attitude to this debate if the Under-Secretary had said that the Government intend to use the powers only when dealing with a reinforcement scheme for non-conventional threats and risks, and that they will not use it for schemes that address what I would call conventional fire and rescue work. The issue slightly alarms me, and I want to return to why the hon. Gentleman thinks that a purely voluntary approach would not work. What evidence does he have?

Phil Hope: What if the voluntary approach breaks down? That is the point about having the ability to direct when necessary. We hope that the voluntary approach works. There have been occasions when, perhaps because there has been a bit of pressure and people are negotiating, the Government have helpfully intervened to encourage a resolution between two authorities working together in a mutual reinforcement scheme. To deny us the fall-back of being able to intervene when a voluntary approach might not work is foolish. I cannot understand the hon. Gentleman's fears in that regard. It is important to have the ability to step in if required. However, we hope and expect the voluntary approach to be successful.

Philip Hammond: The record will show that the Under-Secretary is now saying something different.

Phil Hope: Not at all.

Philip Hammond: The record will show that the hon. Gentleman is now saying that he expects a voluntary approach to be successful. A few moments ago he said that a purely voluntary approach will not deliver. He seems to be saying two different things. I support what he has just told us—that he expects and hopes that the voluntary approach will be successful—and I am relieved that he does not think that a purely voluntary approach will not deliver the resilience that the Government seek. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
 Amendment, by leave, withdrawn. 
 Clause 14 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 15 - Arrangements with other employers offire-fighters

Philip Hammond: I beg to move amendment No. 37, in
clause 15, page 8, line 5, leave out ', 8 or 9'.

Edward O'Hara: With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
 Amendment No. 38, in 
clause 15, page 8, line 6, leave out subsection (2). 
Amendment No. 39, in 
clause 15, page 8, line 7, at end insert— 
 '(2A) A fire and rescue authority may enter into arrangements with any person for securing provision of assistance for the discharge by the authority of a function conferred on it under sections 6, 8, 9 or 11'.

Philip Hammond: Clause 15 deals with the situation where fire authorities want to make arrangements between other private sector, or third party, providers of support whom they may wish to use in certain circumstances. It allows for the equivalent of reinforcement schemes, which are a mutual aid arrangement between fire authorities, on a one-way commercial basis, with third-party employers of fire fighters.
 This is a perfectly sensible arrangement. The obvious case that springs to mind is that of employers of private fire brigades. I think that I am right in saying that British Airports Authority has the fourth-largest fire service in the United Kingdom, measured in terms of manpower and equipment. Although it is spread across a very large area, it is quite a significant resource that could be used as back-up in certain types of emergency. 
 There are other employers of private fire brigades: large commercial undertakings might have fire equipment on their premises that could be brought into service in a particular type of emergency. We are absolutely at one with the purposes of the clause. This is another provision brought forward from 1947, and it gives fire authorities a statutory basis—a proper basis—on which to engage in commercial arrangements with outside bodies. 
 We now need to look at this in the light of the other changes that we have made to the environment in which fire authorities operate and to their functions that. Subsection (1) allows the fire and rescue authority to 
''enter into arrangements with a person who employs fire-fighters . . . for the purpose of the discharge by the authority of a function conferred on it under section 7, 8 or 9.'' 
Clause 7 confers firefighting functions on a fire authority; clause 8 confers road traffic accident functions on a fire authority; and clause 9 deals with other emergencies, which can be anything specified by the Secretary of State. We have already had the benefit of the draft order, so we know that it will include such things as dealing with the response to terrorist attack, major flooding incidents, inshore rescue and perhaps rescue further out at sea, as has previously been seen. However, those are not firefighting functions. 
 The purpose of amendment No. 37 is to challenge the restriction of powers under subsection (1) to arrangements with employers of firefighters. There is no obvious reason why only an employer of firefighters should be contracted to render assistance to a fire authority in relation, for example, to road traffic accidents. Let me give an example. It might be perfectly logical for fire authorities to have stand-by arrangements with operators of heavy lifting equipment, such as large, heavy cranes that can be brought on to the motorway to remove wreckage or, in the case of a building collapsing, the kind of equipment that can be used to jack up and support structural elements of the building. 
 I know that in some cases the Government intend that the fire and rescue services will have access to a pool of such equipment that will be purchased and, I assume, maintained centrally by a designated authority on behalf of the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister. That is fine but, by definition, those will always be centrally pooled resources. It is perfectly logical, particularly in more sparsely populated areas of the country, that fire and rescue authorities may wish to enter into arrangements to bring in assistance—I heard the Minister muttering ''clause 16'', from a sedentary position—not to delegate the discharge of their functions to another person, but to contract with another person to assist them in the discharge of their functions. I take that to be a very different thing. 
 The best and most obvious example is the use of heavy lifting equipment. Why is it necessary for a fire authority to contract for the supply of locally available heavy lifting equipment or hydraulic jacks, and for experts in their use, only if the contractor employs firefighters? That has been brought forward from the 1947 Act, and a time when the only statutory function that we were dealing with was firefighting and the requirement that the person in question employed firefighters would be wholly logical and consistent with the structure of the Act. Now that we have introduced other statutory functions, we must revisit that. Amendment No. 37 is designed to remove the reference to clauses 8 and 9 from subsection (1) so that the restriction on making such arrangements only with employers of firefighters would relate only to firefighting functions. 
 Amendment No. 39 would introduce a new subsection that gives fire and rescue authorities broader powers to enter into arrangements relating to their functions under clause 6—the fire safety promotion clause, which is not mentioned in clause 15. Clause 8 refers to road traffic accidents, clause 9 refers to emergencies as defined by the Secretary of State and clause 11 deals with discretionary services and the power to respond to other eventualities. In relation to those functions, fire authorities could enter into arrangements on a commercial basis with any third parties that they found appropriate. 
 The Under-Secretary needs to explain why there is no reference to clause 6 in clause 15. There are statutory duties on a fire authority for fire safety, and 
 it is perfectly conceivable that authorities will want to contract out—for example, for the fitting of smoke detectors—to a third-party contractor on a commercial basis. I do not see where that power is stipulated.

Phil Hope: In clause 16.

Philip Hammond: The Under-Secretary says again that the power is in clause 16, but that contains the power to delegate the discharge of a function. That is quite different from securing the provision of assistance, which will always be alongside the principal discharge of the function by the fire authority. The delegation to another person of the discharge of a specific function under clause 16 is a different action—it must be, or there would be no point in having both clause 15 and clause 16. If there is a technical explanation, I look forward to hearing it. I hope that the hon. Gentleman takes the amendments in the spirit in which they have been tabled, and will address the issue arising from the change in the core function of fire and rescue authorities.
 Amendment No. 38 would delete subsection (2), which explicitly prevents the entering into of such an arrangement with another fire and rescue authority. I can see where such an idea would come from in the climate of 1947; mutual reinforcement is seen as good, and arm's-length, commercial-type transaction as bad. However, we have moved on since then, and it must be possible for the Under-Secretary to envisage mutual reinforcement schemes as appropriate in some cases, while in others there could be an arrangement that is more on a one-way, arm's-length basis with an authority that will specialise in road traffic accident rescue. 
 Let us consider the Manchester example again. Might it not be sensible, logical and economical for Cheshire fire authority to decide that it wants to contract with Greater Manchester fire authority to deal with road traffic accidents on the M62, which stretches beyond Greater Manchester into Cheshire? That would be a perfectly logical arrangement; it ought be something that fire authorities, discharging their functions efficiently, could decide to do. Fire authority A might decide to contract for a sum of money with fire authority B to provide cover on a defined stretch of motorway. Perhaps that would be a stretch to which there was no easy access for one authority, but which was easily accessible for an adjoining fire authority. 
 In the present mixed-economy climate, in which the Under-Secretary recognises that commercial arrangements and arms-length, one-way, for-cash transactions can be as valid as mutual assistance arrangements, I see no reason to exclude an arms-length arrangement with another fire authority. It must be for each individual authority to decide what is best for its circumstances in each case. We should not constrain them.

Richard Younger-Ross: I will be brief, as I am sure that the Under-Secretary has a lot to say on the amendments. I would hate to do his work for him; he gets paid more than I.
 I am slightly puzzled by the amendments, which would rewrite a clause; they could be called wrecking amendments. Clause 15 relates to arrangements with other employers of firefighters; that is clear. Clause 16 covers all those other matters. How is it that all of a sudden we wish to take apart the arrangements with other firefighters and open up to other potential contractors? That seems an unnecessary complication of the clause.

Philip Hammond: I think that the hon. Gentleman is wrong. Clause 16 also covers firefighting duties. At the end of subsection (1) it specifically refers to
''a function conferred on the first authority under any of sections 6 to 9 and 11.'' 
That would include the firefighting functions under clause 7. It would be wrong to see clause 16 as dealing with functions other than firefighting.

Richard Younger-Ross: I did not say that that was the case; my point was to do with arrangements. Clause 16 allows arrangements with other contractors; clause 15 allows arrangements with other firefighters. That is clear. I cannot see the logic in taking apart a clause, only to repeat it almost in the following clause. The logic of that totally defeats me.
 Had the hon. Gentleman said that he wanted the powers under clause 11 to be extended to clause 15, I would have followed his logic. I cannot see the logic of extending clause 6—which relates to fire safety matters—to other fire authorities. One would assume that BAA fire services would cover that for airports. I cannot see the logic of firefighters at Heathrow airport all of a sudden going out to schools. That would not be within their remit and would be far better done by those in the community.

Phil Hope: Amendments Nos. 37 to 39 would allow fire and rescue authorities to enter into arrangements with any body, including other fire and rescue authorities, to secure assistance for their duties under clauses 6, 8, 9 and 11. However, the amendments would keep the restriction that only an employer of firefighters can assist in firefighting duties.
 Clause 15, to which the amendments relate, should be read with clause 13, which provides for reinforcement schemes. The intention of clause 15 is to give fire and rescue authorities the flexibility to complement their reinforcement schemes. Clause 13 ensures that core duties that require an emergency response, such as fighting fires and dealing with road traffic accidents and emergencies designated under clause 9, are discharged effectively, regardless of geographical boundaries or authorities. Clause 15 allows arrangements for firefighters not employed by fire and rescue authorities to be deployed to assist with such incidents. As the hon. Member for Runnymede and Weybridge has explained, one example would be a firefighter who is employed in commercial airports and by the Ministry of Defence. 
 Amendment No. 38 is unnecessary. It deletes clause 15(2), which ensures that there is no overlap between clause 13, relating to mutual assistance between fire and rescue authorities, and clause 15, relating to arrangements between fire and rescue authorities and other employers of firefighters. The point is that the arrangements between fire authorities that the hon. Gentleman described would be exercised under clause 13. 
 It may be helpful to explain that in the Fire Services Act 1947 mutual reinforcement schemes between fire and rescue authorities and between a fire and rescue authority and another employer of firefighters were elided together in one clause. Clauses 13 and 15 separate those out to clarify the powers of mutual reinforcement schemes between fire and rescue authorities and between a fire and rescue authority and another employer of firefighters.

Philip Hammond: Is the Under-Secretary saying that it will be possible for one fire and rescue authority to enter into an arrangement with another that is not a mutual reinforcing scheme, but a scheme under which fire and rescue authority B contracts to provide assistance for money to fire and rescue authority A?

Phil Hope: The nature of reinforcement schemes is covered by provisions in clause 13. The hon. Gentleman described a theoretical example of a scheme between Cheshire and Manchester. He has an obsession with Cheshire and Manchester.

Nick Raynsford: He is going there tomorrow.

Philip Hammond: I have been studying the road.

Phil Hope: By separating the two provisions to make clear the various powers, duties and directions under clauses 13 and 15, we are clarifying what is possible. The kind of arrangements that the hon. Gentleman described would be a reinforcement scheme under clause 13. It is for the two authorities to decide and discuss how that scheme would work—subject to the directions under clause 14 if one of them did not agree with it, which we debated earlier.

Philip Hammond: To be absolutely clear on that matter, as the Under-Secretary has avoided use of the word ''money'', is he saying that under clause 13 a scheme could be put in place in which the assistance was not mutual but one-way and paid for by money from the first authority? Is that possible?

Phil Hope: The nature of the reinforcement scheme would be a matter for the local authorities involved.
 There is confusion in the hon. Gentleman's mind about what clause 16 may or may not cover. Amendment No. 38 is unnecessary because those arrangements are covered by clause 13. Amendment No. 37 is unhelpful because by removing references to clauses 8 and 9—that deal with road traffic accidents and emergencies designated by order respectively—it would remove the symmetry between clauses 13 and 15. That would mean that arrangements made under 
 those clauses would be unable to compliment each other so successfully. The essence of the two clauses is that they mirror one another. 
 Amendment No. 39 extends the scope of clause 15 so that arrangements for assistance can be made with any person for a wider range of fire and rescue authority functions. That is confusing because it breaks the link with reinforcement schemes under clause 13, and then muddies the waters of the relationship with clause 16. We will come to clause 16 later, but it may help hon. Members if I point out the differences between clauses 15 and 16. 
 Under clause 15, a fire and rescue authority is securing help to discharge its own functions—for example, when an airport fire service is sent to assist with a fire outside the airport. Under clause 16, a fire and rescue authority's functions are discharged by another. The point of that delegation is that it can be ''to any extent'', as line 16 of page 8 states. Therefore, the hon. Gentleman's concerns about whether a fire risk authority could enter into arrangements with organisations other than those employing firefighters are covered by clause 16. 
 Clauses 13 and 15, taken together with clause 16, provide a set of practical and effective powers for fire and rescue authorities that ensure that they can make appropriate and flexible arrangements for delivering all the services that the public expect. I make the hon. Gentleman an offer. I have asked officials for the details to be spelled out in an easy-to-read table. Clauses 13, 15 and 16 refer to different relationships between fire authorities, and between fire authorities and other employers and other bodies. What applies to each is different because of the way in which we have framed the legislation. If it assists the hon. Gentleman, I shall have that laid out in a helpful table, which I shall give to him this afternoon if a copy can be produced by then.

Philip Hammond: I suppose I should be grateful to the Under-Secretary for his offer, although having spent the entire recess week studying the clauses, I am not sure that I am terribly flattered by the suggestion that a helpful table provided by his officials will be necessary. He will have heard of the campaign for plain English. If it really requires a table to be provided by officials to enable reasonably engaged and well-educated Members of Parliament to understand the provisions, there is a problem.
 In my experience, parliamentary draftsmen are careful with language, even if I do not always like it. Clause 15 refers specifically to 
''securing the provision by that person of assistance''. 
Clause 16 refers to entering into arrangements 
''for the discharge to any extent by that other authority or person of a function''. 
I consider that it is not accidental that different language has been used in the two clauses, but that they convey something significantly different. The hon. Gentleman suggested that the degree of delegation of the arrangement is similar under clauses 15 and 16. That is not how I understood the position. 
 It is important that we understand not only the scope of the parties that may enter into arrangements under clauses 15 and 16, but the quality and nature of those arrangements.

Phil Hope: I have already spelled out the difference between clauses 15 and 16 and the ability under clause 16 for fire and rescue authorities to enter into arrangements with others who are not employers of other firefighters. It is important that clause 15 spells out the conditions under which there can be arrangements between fire and rescue authorities and other employers of firefighters. I ask the hon. Gentleman to withdraw the amendment because it would affirm examples of ongoing ineffective practice that we do not wish to be continued.

Philip Hammond: I have a couple of points to make. It seems that fire is still being treated differently from the other now to be core functions of fire and rescue authorities, such as dealing with road traffic accidents and other emergencies, fire safety and prevention. I thought that one of the objectives of the Bill was to broaden the role of fire and rescue authorities and make it clear that they had the other functions on an equal status. I am not sure why arrangements with other employers of firefighters should be treated differently, as the Under-Secretary suggests.
 I did not hear the hon. Gentleman reply specifically to my question—perhaps he imagined that a response was implicit in his answer. I wanted to know whether an arrangement made under clause 13 allows a one-way relationship when the assistance is provided in one direction and money flows in the other direction. It is not clear that the term ''mutual reinforcement'' embraces the concept of a one-way relationship when no assistance, but simply a payment of money, is provided from authority A to authority B. If he cannot confirm that his concept of mutuality involves assistance being provided in one direction only, that will certainly explain one of the issues that are at the root of the debate. 
 In his response, the Under-Secretary said that amendment No. 38 would break the symmetry between clauses 15 and 13. He then went on to observe, correctly, that amendment No. 39 would restore that link. Amendments Nos. 38 and 39 would simply separate the arrangements for procuring assistance to deal with firefighting functions under clause 7, limiting them to arrangements with employers of firefighters, and deal under a new subsection with the arrangements for procuring assistance to cover functions under clauses 8 and 9—and, indeed, clauses 6 and 11. I therefore do not agree at all that the amendments break any link between clauses 13 and 15 in their entirety. Of course, if the Under-Secretary chooses to consider only amendment No. 38 and ignore amendment No. 39, he will think what he said he thought; however, the group of amendments is not intended to break that link. 
 I am frankly surprised that the amendments appear to have been dismissed not merely because some technical deficiency or superfluity, as I was expecting—I have become accustomed to that. The Under-Secretary appears to suggest that the amendments strike a blow to the architecture of the Bill, but that was not what we had in mind—in fact, we genuinely thought that there was an error in the structure of clause 15(1), because it is difficult to understand the logic of restricting the arrangements to employers of firefighters when the arrangements might be targeted on entirely different fire authority functions. 
 The Under-Secretary has made his point and we have listened to what he said. It is a complicated issue. With the benefit of his helpful table, I shall ponder the matters before the Report stage. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment. 
 Amendment, by leave, withdrawn. 
 Clause 15 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 16 - Arrangements for discharge of functions by others

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

Edward O'Hara: With this it will be convenient to discuss new clause 1—Fire and Rescue Authority: discharge of functions—
 '(1) It shall be the duty of a fire and rescue authority to make provision for the discharge of the functions conferred on it by sections 6, 7, 8 and 9 with economy, efficiency and effectiveness. 
 (2) A fire and rescue authority shall formally review the arrangements it has made under the provisions of sections 13, 15 and 16 at least once every two years and shall satisfy itself that the arrangements it has in place under these sections and the provision it has made for discharging its functions under sections 6, 7, 8 and 9 discharge with its duty under subsection (1). 
 (3) The Secretary of State may provide such support and assistance as he considers necessary to fire and rescue authorities in discharging their obligations under this section and to assist them in using their powers under sections 13, 15 and 16 to ensure that their functions are discharged with the greatest possible economy, efficiency and effectiveness.'.

Philip Hammond: Clauses 13, 15 and 16 of the Bill provide a sensible framework for what I shall call ''outsourcing'', and for mutual reinforcement and the procuring of specialist assistance. It must make sense to have a framework that allows not only co-operation between authorities, but the provision by one authority—of its own initiative—of a service to other authorities. Under provisions elsewhere in the Bill, the Secretary of State can require an authority to deliver a service in the area of another authority.
 It must make sense to allow fire and rescue authorities to procure services and assistance from third parties—whether they be bodies such as the Ministry of Defence, or commercial third parties—which either operate fire or rescue services incidental to their own operations, or have specialist equipment or manpower available that might be appropriate. Fire 
 and rescue services will called to deal with certain types of event so rarely that it is almost inevitable that greater expertise and more suitable equipment will be available elsewhere: for example, someone who routinely handles chemicals as part of their commercial business is likely to have readily available the appropriate equipment to deal with a chemical incident. All of that is entirely sensible. It will be interesting later on to see just how far Ministers envisage that going. 
 Last year, at the Local Government Association fire conference, which the Minister of State attended, I was approached by a gentleman from Denmark, a representative of the private sector company that runs the Danish fire service. The Minister may also have had such an approach—if he did not keep the gentleman's card, I can lend it to him. It would be interesting to discover whether Ministers have considered the possibility of the functions of fire and rescue authorities being contracted out wholesale to properly qualified third-party contractors. I do not know whether the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister has looked at that. It would also be interesting to learn how the system in Denmark works and how effective and economical it is. I know that the Minister is very interested in efficiency and economy, so he will want to explore as deeply as possible all the available options. 
 New clause 1 creates a framework for requiring fire and rescue authorities to discharge the functions that are conferred on them by clauses 6, 7, 8 and 9 with ''economy, efficiency and effectiveness''—we have heard those words several times. That requirement is specifically stated, and is then used as a building block to require authorities formally and periodically to review the arrangements that they have made under clause 13 for mutual reinforcement schemes, under clause 15 for the procurement of assistance, and under clause 16 for the discharge of functions by others. 
 Testing will take place all the time to ensure that the arrangements that they have put in place under those clauses comply with their duty to discharge their core functions with ''economy, efficiency and effectiveness.'' That is something like a best value test. The following questions will be asked: ''Is there somebody out there who could deliver any of the functions that we are gearing up to deliver more efficiently or at lower cost, and if there is nobody out there who can do that today, will there be tomorrow?'' There will be constant testing and re-testing of the decisions that an authority has taken. 
 New clause 1 goes further. Subsection (3) empowers the Secretary of State to 
''provide such support and assistance as he considers necessary to fire and rescue authorities in discharging their obligations under this section and to assist them in using their powers under sections 13, 15 and 16''. 
I am seeking a commitment from the ODPM to support best practice. Without naming names, we all know that fire authorities differ in their attitude to innovation and modernisation. Some fire authorities will embrace with enthusiasm the possibility of contracting out certain services or entering into collaborative arrangements, but others will take a 
 more blinkered view, and it has to be said that, on past form, some will take a dogmatic political stance on how a public authority should discharge its functions. 
 I do not favour the Secretary of State wading in with steel toe-capped boots to enforce such arrangements on authorities, because the core motivator for locally accountable, democratically answerable authorities should be the interests of their electors. Their search for best value should be driven by a sense of answerability to the payers of their council tax rather than by somebody in Whitehall telling them that there are cheaper ways to do things. None the less, it would be helpful if the ODPM were actively to engage in disseminating best practice—in promoting awareness of what is going on in other authorities and of opportunities to contract out certain peripheral or support functions in a way that would allow fire authorities to increase their efficiency, effectiveness and economy. This is our preferred route to defend the independence and accountability of locally-based fire and rescue authorities and at the same time to encourage collaboration, outsourcing and mutual co-operation so that they deliver services with maximum economy, efficiency and effectiveness—and all with the Government's active support and encouragement. I recognise that subsection (3) as tabled merely provides a power to the Secretary of State and does not oblige him to provide that supportive environment, but I hope that the Under-Secretary will tell us how the ODPM intends to engage actively in this process.

Stephen McCabe: I want to give the hon. Gentleman every opportunity to be absolutely honest with us. I have listened to him with great interest, but there seems to be repetition of words. We are obsessed with outsourcing and with procurement for commercial third parties. Earlier there was an invitation from a private Danish company to tout for business. I do not know what the situation is in Runnymede and Weybridge, but the poor people of Cheshire should be worried that their fire service could be reduced to a mere contract operation. Is the hon. Gentleman telling us the full truth about his intentions, or are we getting a glimpse of new Tory, new privatisation?

Philip Hammond: I am extremely grateful to the hon. Gentleman for providing a classic demonstration of the kind of thinking that might be going on in the darkest recesses of some of our less forward-thinking fire authorities. The purpose of probing the Under-Secretary on these issues is precisely to discover how far the Government's thinking has gone down this route. Are there any lines in the sand? Are there any areas that they would regard as not appropriate for outsourcing—to use the term again? It could be outsourcing to another fire and rescue authority, and not necessarily to a commercial third party. We spent some time in the last debate trying to establish that an outsourcing arrangement could be made between fire authorities on what would effectively be a commercial basis, with one authority providing services for another.
 I make no apology for saying that this is the model that I commend. The unit of democratic accountability needs to be small enough to be meaningful, but we must recognise that for many services, the operational unit will need to be larger. I see no contradiction between having a democratically accountable authority responsible for the discharge of a function and the recognition that that function can be economically discharged only on a larger scale, so the authority should seek to deliver it by contracting it to another provider or by collaborating with adjacent authorities. That is a flexible approach. 
 There is little risk in allowing fire authorities almost unlimited scope in discharging their functions, provided that they are held to account for their proper discharge and the authorities are based on units that allow proper democratic accountability and transparency. That is why we favour the smaller structure of local fire authorities rather than the mega-regional authorities that the Under-Secretary appears to favour. I hope that he will engage constructively in the issues raised by the new clause. 
 You said, Mr. O'Hara, that this debate was to incorporate the stand part debate. The term ''firefighter'' is used in clauses 15 and 16, but so far as I can see, it is not defined in the Bill. As a restriction is placed on the type of person who can be engaged in the arrangement under clause 15, will the Under-Secretary point to where we can find the definition of a firefighter? Clearly, if that is simply a person who goes out and fights fires, the definition is tautologous. Any person employed by someone contracted through an arrangement under clause 15 would be by definition a firefighter, so there must be some qualification of the term if the clause is to have any real meaning. I would be grateful if the Under-Secretary could explain where I might find that definition.

Phil Hope: Just to be clear, are we are taking clause stand part with the debate, not new clause 1?

Edward O'Hara: Yes—the question is that clause 16 stand part, and it is convenient that we consider new clause 1 with that, so I will be putting clause stand part at the end of the debate.

Phil Hope: Thank you, Mr. O'Hara. The hon. Member for Runnymede and Weybridge was usefully questioned by my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, Hall Green. On the one hand the hon. Gentleman supports clause 16, but on the other he suggests that his limits go a lot further than he would otherwise wish the wider fire and rescue community to know.
 I will start with new clause 1 and move on to clause stand part if that is acceptable to the Committee. I was being excoriated earlier for seeking reserve powers if fire and rescue authorities did not voluntarily co-operate with each other in a reinforcement scheme. However, the hon. Gentleman introduced new clause 1 by describing some authorities as blinkered and in need of measures to deal with them, which is entirely 
 the reverse of the argument he put when I was defending the need for reserve powers where voluntary arrangements could not be created.

Philip Hammond: I was choosing my words carefully. I could have used the term ''Labour-controlled'' about one authority that particularly springs to mind, but I chose to use ''blinkered'' instead.

Phil Hope: I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for that clarification, although it does not take us any further forward.
 New clause 1 would create a duty for the fire and rescue authorities to ensure that provisions to carry out their core duties were arranged economically, efficiently and effectively. Any reinforcement scheme, arrangement for support from an employer of firefighters, or arrangement to delegate a fire and rescue authority's functions would have to be reviewed at least once every two years to ensure that it still facilitated the authority's duty under subsection (1) to discharge core functions efficiently, effectively and economically. 
 The new clause would empower the Secretary of State to offer assistance and support to fire and rescue authorities in their endeavour to undertake the duties under the provision. It is unnecessary because all fire and rescue authorities are best value authorities and as such have a duty under section 3(1) of the Local Government Act 1999 to make arrangements for continuous improvement in economy, efficiency and effectiveness. 
 Subsection (3) would empower the Secretary of State to provide such support and assistance as he considered necessary to fire and rescue authorities in discharging those duties. However, new powers are unnecessary because the 1999 Act empowers the Secretary of State to issue guidance, set standards, make directions and provide for the performance of functions by an authority. Those provisions are further supported by the new national framework powers provided for in the Bill. 
 In addition, proposed subsection (2) is wholly ineffective because it does not state what a fire and rescue authority should do if its arrangements under clauses 13, 15 and 16 were found not to comply with its duty to carry out its core functions effectively, efficiently and economically. For example, under clause 16 the fire and rescue authorities may be bound by a contract lasting longer than the two years. New clause 1 gives no direction about what should be done with such an arrangement should it fail to meet requirements under proposed subsection (2). 
 Although I agree with the spirit of the new clause, according to which fire and rescue authorities should discharge their duties with regard to the three Es—economy, efficiency and effectiveness—I cannot support one that will serve only to repeat legislation that is already in place.

Philip Hammond: The Under-Secretary has explained why proposed subsection (3) is not needed, but will he explain what the ODPM intends to do about promoting the powers that fire authorities would have
 under clauses 15 and 16? Without wanting to go too far down the route suggested by the hon. Member for Birmingham, Hall Green, I am trying to understand, for the benefit of the Committee, how far the Government wish to pursue an agenda that actively seeks to go beyond the authority's own internal employee resources in delivering services.

Phil Hope: This is the clause stand part point; it is about clause 16. It re-enacts and extends powers under section 12 of the 1947 Act to allow a fire and rescue authority to delegate to others, including other fire and rescue authorities, the discharge of part or all of the function conferred on it under clauses 6 to 9, and clause 11. An example of such an arrangement would be where a fire and rescue authority might decide a contract with the local education authorities to promote fire safety education within its school.
 In Cornwall recently, I met firefighters who were conducting an excellent scheme of fire education with young people, in collaboration with the local education authority. There are similar arrangements throughout the country, where fire authorities are working with education authorities to ensure that there is good fire safety education. 
 Another example would be a fire rescue authority that has specialist expertise in, let us say, rope rescue, which it provides under contract to a neighbouring authority. However, in recognition of the particular expertise involved in firefighting, under clause 16, a fire and rescue authority may delegate the discharge of its function to extinguish fires only to persons who employ fire-fighters. The existing powers to delegate are, by necessity, limited by the narrow scope of the 1947 Act, which sees fighting fires as the only duty. Clause 16 extends those provisions to take account of the wider role of the fire and rescue service and the contribution that others can provide towards our objective of a more modern and effective service. 
 The Bill is not about the wholesale privatisation of the fire and rescue service—although that is possibly the way that some Members of this Committee may be going. The Bill gives fire and rescue authorities flexibility to work in partnership with others to discharge their functions. That could include arrangements with private companies. We see no reason why a fire and rescue authority should be prevented from delegating its fire safety function, as I have just described, to another provider. Ultimately, the authority is accountable for the services that it provides. The flexibility to work with others is a key component in efficient and effective service delivery. It is widespread and successful elsewhere in local government. There is no reason why these opportunities should not be available to fire and rescue authorities, subject—as I have said already—to the limitations concerning extinguishing fires, where specialist training and expertise are crucial. 
 Lastly, there is no definition of the term ''firefighter'' in the Bill. However, this term is widely used and widely understood throughout the fire and rescue services. It is not defined in the 1947 Act either. I hope that after those words of reassurance about the 
 purpose of clause 16 and the lack of any need for new clause 1, the hon. Gentleman will withdraw his amendment.

Edward O'Hara: Order. The question of the inclusion, or otherwise, of new clauses in the Bill comes later in our proceedings. The question that we shall consider is whether clause 16 should stand part of the Bill.

Philip Hammond: I have to say that I am pleased with the Under-Secretary's reply. It was a very good answer. To some extent, this is how we should conduct our business: we table a new clause that seeks to understand what the Government are doing, and the Government answer that the new clause is not required for the following reasons, and explain how those things will be done. Then it is all on the record and everybody is clear about what is intended.
 I am delighted that the obligation for a fire authority to review arrangements that it has made, or, perhaps more importantly, to review the fact that it has not made arrangements under these clauses, will be a continuous duty that it will have to perform. That is very helpful. 
 The Under-Secretary said that the drafting of subsection (2) of the new clause was defective because it did not suggest what a fire and rescue authority should do if it found that the arrangements that it had entered into were no longer appropriate. I do not have the statutes to hand, Mr O'Hara, but I know that I could take a leaf out of the hon. Gentleman's book and quote some paragraph of a local government Act that would make it clear that once an authority has formally determined that it is doing something in a way that is not efficient, effective and economic, it had better do something about it. At the very least it will have publicly recognised a weakness in its arrangements, which will be clear to its electors and council tax payers. That, of course, is what accountability is all about. 
 The Under-Secretary said that new clause 1(3) was not needed because the ODPM had the powers anyway. I was seeking to test the extent of the Government's enthusiasm for the use of the provisions. We have had a little charade, which we are becoming pretty used to, whereby the Government introduce legislation that makes it possible to make a perfectly sensible arrangement between a public authority responsible for discharging a function and a private commercial body that will undertake that discharge in an economical way that makes sense for that authority, but then they say that the Opposition would like to privatise everything, while implying that the Government's view of the potential for such an arrangement is that somebody from the private sector may be able to come in and sharpen the pencils if that is necessary and it is something that it can do better. 
 We have seen that although the rhetoric of Ministers at this stage is to talk down the scope for engaging in non-conventional arrangements, there is probably little difference between the political parties in their enthusiasm for securing the best possible deal for the taxpayer by ensuring that publicly accountable 
 authorities, while remaining entirely accountable for the discharge of their functions, can organise the provision of services in the way that delivers the best value for their ratepayers.

Nick Raynsford: We will see that later.

Philip Hammond: The Minister says that we will see that later. I am not sure whether he means later in our discussions on the Bill, or later when there is a Conservative Government and he can see how my right hon. Friend the Member for Skipton and Ripon (Mr. Curry) discharges the extensive powers that the Minister is generously seeking to make available to him.
 I am slightly concerned about what the Under-Secretary said about the definition of the term ''firefighter''. He said that there was no definition. I rather suspected as much—and I rather suspected that that has never been a problem. However, we now have something rather different, because clause 15 specifically limits the class of person with whom an arrangement can be made to a person who employs firefighters. That puts the need for a definition of a firefighter on a different level. The hon. Gentleman might want to reflect upon that, because otherwise it seems to me that somebody who fights fires becomes by definition a firefighter, and the thing becomes completely circular. 
 If clause 16 is to stand as drafted, I cannot see why there should not be a definition in the Bill that refers to appropriate skills, training and experience, or something of that nature. Otherwise the restriction in clause 15 is meaningless—but as this is a stand part debate, I have said everything that I need to say. 
 Question put and agreed to. 
 Clause 16 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 17 - Directions as to arrangements under section 16

Philip Hammond: I beg to move amendment No. 43, in
clause 17, page 8, line 29, leave out from '(1)' to 'one' in line 30 and insert
'only if requested to do so by'.

Edward O'Hara: With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
 Amendment No. 44, in 
clause 17, page 8, line 34, leave out 'may' and insert 'shall'. 
Amendment No. 158, in 
clause 17, page 8, line 34, leave out 'may' and insert 'will'.

Philip Hammond: Clause 17 deals with the Secretary of State's power to direct the discharge of functions by one authority on behalf of another, or one body on behalf of another. We are concerned not about the underlying ability to enter into those arrangements, as I have made clear, but about the Secretary of State's power to direct such arrangements, because we believe that the responsibility and accountability for the
 discharge of its functions must lie with the individual authority. We strongly support the making of arrangements between authorities, and between authorities and third parties, for the efficient, effective and economical discharge of their duties. Our position is that the arrangements must be on a voluntary basis.
 The power of the Secretary of State to order that a fire authority's functions be discharged by others is inconsistent with the maintenance of a genuine locally managed and accountable service. Let us consider what would happen if the fire and rescue authority in county X were ordered by the Secretary of State to contract out a chunk of its core functions to a third party, which could be another fire and rescue authority, a commercial contractor or a provider of certain services. The fire and rescue authority would rightly argue that it had not determined the arrangement and could not therefore be answerable for the efficiency, effectiveness and economy with which those services were discharged on behalf of the local council tax payers. That seems entirely wrong and inappropriate in the usual routine circumstances. 
 As usual under the Bill, it is necessary to enter a caveat. If the Under-Secretary were focusing specifically on extreme arrangements to deal with high-level terrorist threats and so on, we would understand, because we have always acknowledged that different arrangements will need to be in place in such circumstances. We are willing to enter into such a debate, but our problem is that the need for resilience against that new and literally terrifying threat is constantly prayed in aid of all sorts of intervention powers for the Secretary of State, but that those powers are not limited to those circumstances. They can just as easily be deployed in relation to the discharge of fire safety functions, road traffic accident work, flooding, inshore rescue and any of the other matters for which fire and rescue authorities will have responsibility. 
 The only constraint on the Secretary of State is the requirement to proceed with the direction only when he believes it is expedient to do so to secure 
''greater economy, efficiency and effectiveness.'' 
As drafted, subsection (2) allows the Secretary of State to give a direction 
''on his own initiative or at the request of one of the authorities.'' 
Amendment No. 43 would limit the Secretary of State's power to make an arrangement for discharge of function to a situation in which he had been requested to do so by one of the parties involved. In other words, it would eliminate the power of the Secretary of State to act on his own initiative. 
 Amendment No. 44 would change the meaning of subsection (3)(b) to require an inquiry to be held before a direction is made, whereas the Bill is purely permissive and allows the Secretary of State to hold an inquiry if he wishes. It would substitute ''shall'' for ''may'' in the provision. 
 Perhaps the hon. Member for Teignbridge (Richard Younger-Ross) had not noticed amendment No. 44 when he tabled the Liberal Democrat amendment, No. 158. That amendment would insert ''will'' in place of ''may'' rather than the word ''shall''. Unless that is a 
 deliberate ploy to avoid adding his name to my amendment, I suggest that ''will'' does not have much to recommend it over ''shall''. Indeed, ''shall'' might be a more conventional form of drafting. I hope that we are in agreement about the principle of requiring an inquiry to be held before the Secretary of State uses such a significant power to override local responsibility for the discharge of functions by imposing such an arrangement.

Richard Younger-Ross: I concur with the hon. Gentleman's comments. I shall go no further than that, except to say that the Under-Secretary conceded that there was an argument when we debated the difference between ''may'' and ''shall'' earlier. One hopes that he will make the same concession now.

Edward O'Hara: Order. I think that the difference may be that ''shall'' means that people have to do something whether they like it or not.

Phil Hope: Amendment No. 43 would remove the Secretary of State's power to direct two authorities to enter into an arrangement for the discharge of any of their functions without a request from one of the authorities. Amendments Nos. 44 and 158 would oblige the Secretary of State to cause an inquiry to be held before giving any direction to fire and rescue authorities to enter into an arrangement.
 Clause 17 re-enacts provisions in section 12 of the 1947 Act that grant the Secretary of State a dual role in respect of delegation of the discharge of functions. As we said earlier, that role is in part to act as an umpire when asked to determine a disagreement between two fire and rescue authorities, but also to initiate action that he believes to be necessary. I stress that any direction under clause 17 must be with a view to securing greater economy, efficiency and effectiveness. 
 The existing power under the 1947 Act for the Secretary of State to act on his own initiative is an important safeguard. I emphasise that exercise of the power to act on his initiative would be evidence based, and used only as a last resort, but it is an important measure. Frankly, it would be ridiculous if the Secretary of State could not intervene in such circumstances unless invited to do so by one of the parties, as would be the case under amendment No. 43. I hope that that reassures the hon. Member for Runnymede and Weybridge. 
 The fall-back position as a last resort is important. We visited that territory earlier when we debated clause 14, and I emphasise the point again.

Philip Hammond: Can the Under-Secretary explain why, when neither authority wants to go ahead with the arrangement in question, the power is needed separately under clause 16? My understanding is that the Secretary of State already has powers to direct that an authority will discharge its functions beyond its own area. Therefore, he could achieve the same objective without the power in clause 16.

Phil Hope: The power in clause 17 applies to clause 16. It is important that the Secretary of State has the ability to intervene if all else has failed and economy, efficiency or effectiveness is not being achieved through clause 16. The Secretary of State must have the ability to intervene as a last resort in such cases.
 Before issuing a direction of that kind, which I emphasise would be a last resort, the Secretary of State must give the fire and rescue authorities affected the opportunity to make representations to him, and he may hold an inquiry. However, amendments Nos. 44 and 158 would go beyond that, as they would oblige the Secretary of State to hold an inquiry before issuing a direction. The real difficulty with that is that holding such an inquiry, which could take months if not years, would lead to long and unacceptable delays in securing an acceptable service for the community. That would not be fulfilling our duties as a Government, and it would not be of service to the community.

Richard Younger-Ross: When Ministers were making the point earlier about the delay of an inquiry in the context of another clause, I could follow the argument. However, this clause relates to arrangements for others to discharge functions. I cannot quite grasp why the Under-Secretary is so keen that there should be powers to direct an authority partially to privatise in order to go down another route. The Secretary of State already has powers to force an authority to undertake functions, and he has powers to deal with it if it fails to discharge those functions. I cannot see why he should also need a great deal of power to force them to use other bodies to undertake functions that he can force them to undertake anyway.

Phil Hope: The hon. Gentleman is wrong to suggest that these are powers to enforce privatisation. If the Secretary of State believes that decisions made by a fire and rescue authority in discharging its functions through others are inefficient, uneconomic and ineffective, and would therefore put services to the community at risk, he needs the ability to take powers, if required, as a last resort. To have an inquiry that might hold that process up when it was needed because of the urgency of the situation would also present a difficulty.
 The Secretary of State may choose to hold an inquiry if circumstances permit, but would need to have as a measure of last resort the ability to intervene swiftly, and in a way that would not be delayed, to ensure that the service to the community was upheld. I understand the fears that both hon. Members have expressed, but the provision is a re-enactment of the existing power in the 1947 Act to ensure that local authorities discharge their functions in a manner that is economic, effective and efficient, which ensures that the community will be served properly.

Philip Hammond: Will the Under-Secretary explain the asymmetry between clauses 16 and 17? He presented clause 17 as a power to direct fire authorities to enter arrangements that they have the ability to
 enter under clause 16, but it is not. Under clause 16 a fire and rescue authority may enter into arrangements with another fire and rescue authority, or any other person. The power of direction, however, is limited to an arrangement between two fire authorities. That is slightly odd, and seems to prejudge the efficient, effective and economical discharge of any particular function. Why have the Government created that asymmetry?

Phil Hope: The hon. Gentleman has failed to understand that the clause provides a final safeguard for the community and the public, to ensure that they receive services that are economic, efficient and effective. I cannot understand the reluctance of hon. Members from both Opposition parties to ensure that the Secretary of State can introduce that. The measures will ensure that two fire authorities can work together in a way that meets the needs of local people. I am at a loss to understand why, in the exceptional situation when that fails to occur, the hon. Member for Runnymede and Weybridge would want to allow an unacceptable situation to carry on.
 We have an obligation—and if he ever were in Government, the hon. Gentleman would have the same obligation—to ensure that the community is properly served by those fire authorities. I am sure that if he were sitting on the Government side of the Room—which I dare say he will not be for many years—he would want that safeguard. I hope that after that assurance, he will withdraw his amendment.

Philip Hammond: That is what we call slipping into the error of 1992, and I would caution the Under-Secretary against it. I hear what he said, but I think he has misunderstood—[Interruption.] I think that ''Sheffield'' is the word that the Minister of State is groping for. I was trying to ask the Under-Secretary why, in granting the Government those powers under the clause, which he has just robustly defended—we may have our differences but I understand what he says—he has chosen to limit the power of the Secretary of State to intervene to only part of the scope of clause 16. That was my question, and he has not really addressed that point.
 I am at a loss to understand why the Government have chosen to limit that provision, and are making a judgment in advance that it would be appropriate to require one authority to have its functions discharged by another authority, but it would never be appropriate to have any of those functions discharged by a third party, such as the Ministry of Defence. I can envisage, for example, a remote area where there happens to be an RAF base with substantial firefighting capability, but it is a long way away from the nearest convenient fire service appliance, or there might be an opportunity to remove a local fire service appliance if the RAF capability could be deployed. However, the Secretary of State could not impose such an arrangement. 
 I am not suggesting that I want to give the Secretary of State more power, but I want to understand why the power that he is taking is asymmetrical in relation to the different solutions to the problem that he foresees. If the Under-Secretary wants to intervene, I shall be happy to hear what he says. [Interruption.] However, he does not. When I see Ministers conferring, I always think something might come of it—but clearly that is rather ambitious. 
 I have spelled out my concern, and I do not believe that we have had an answer. However, looking around me and looking at the clock, I feel that it would perhaps not be in the Committee's interests to press the amendment to a vote. Therefore, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment. 
 Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Richard Younger-Ross: I beg to move amendment No. 161, in
clause 17, page 8, line 40, after 'securing' insert 'public safety'.
 This is a repeat of an earlier debate, so I can be fairly brief. The amendment would add ''public safety'' to the Secretary of State's considerations when he is giving a direction under the clause. When we tried to insert the words in an earlier clause, it was argued that it was not appropriate because they were covered by the word ''effectiveness''. In that debate I referred to clause 22(3)(a), which contains the words ''public safety''. That clause relates to an intervention by the Secretary of State within the fire and rescue national framework. The directions being given in the clause are in some ways similar to the order that would be given under clause 22, so the words ''public safety'' should be inserted for greater clarity.

Phil Hope: The amendment would restrict the Secretary of State's power under the clause to making directions that secure public safety, greater economy, efficiency and effectiveness. The clause allows the Secretary of State to direct two fire and rescue authorities to make, vary or cancel an arrangement made under clause 16. Subsection (4) restricts the directions that the Secretary of State can make to those that he considers will secure greater economy, efficiency and effectiveness. The addition of the words ''public safety'' is unnecessary. We have travelled this path before.
 Protecting the public is at the core of what fire and rescue services do. It is difficult to imagine an effective fire and rescue authority that did not have regard to public safety. Equally, in making a direction under the clause, the Secretary of 
 State would find it difficult to direct a fire and rescue authority to do something that improved its effectiveness but had a negative impact on public safety. Therefore, I ask the hon. Gentleman to withdraw his amendment.

Richard Younger-Ross: In that case I am totally perplexed about why the words ''public safety'' appear in clause 22. Considering the time, I am happy to withdraw the amendment, but I should have thought
 there would be greater clarity if the words were included in the clause. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
 Amendment, by leave, withdrawn. 
 Clause 17 ordered to stand part of the Bill. 
 Clause 18 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 19 - Charging

Richard Younger-Ross: I beg to move amendment No. 70, in
clause 19, page 9, line 7, leave out subsection (1) and insert—
 '(1) Subject to the following provisions a fire and rescue authority may charge a person for providing a service to them if:
(a) the authority is authorised, but not required, by an enactment, to provide the service to them, and
(b) they have agreed to the provision.'.

Edward O'Hara: With this it will be convenient to discuss amendment No. 71, in
clause 19, page 9, leave out lines 16 to 18 and insert— 
 'If a fire and rescue authority decide to charge for taking an action of particular description—'.

Richard Younger-Ross: Amendment No. 71 is a tidying-up amendment consequent on amendment No. 70 being accepted. We want the fire and rescue authorities to have greater freedom in charging than the Bill allows. The clause says:
 ''The Secretary of State may by order authorise a fire and rescue authority to charge a person of a specified description for any action of a specified description taken by the authority.'' 
We seek to remove the need for the Secretary of State to make an order to allow an authority to charge and, instead, empower the authority to charge, as local authorities charge under the Local Government Act 2003. In short, we are trying to create the same rules for charging that currently apply to local authorities. 
 It being twenty-five minutes past Eleven o'clock, The Chairman adjourned the Committee without Question put, pursuant to the Standing Order. 
Adjourned till this day at half-past Two o'clock. 
O'Hara, Mr. Edward ( 
 Chairman 
 Bailey, Mr. 
 Ellman, Mrs. 
 Flook, Mr. 
 Follett, Barbara 
 Gilroy, Linda 
 Hammond, Mr. 
 Hope, Phil 
 Humble, Mrs. 
 McCabe, Mr. 
 Murphy, Mr. 
 Pugh, Dr. 
 Raynsford, Mr. 
 Swire, Mr. 
 Younger-Ross, Mr.